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U. S. TRADE POLICY - PROCEDURES AND PROSPECTS* 
By Ambassador Clayton Yeutter 
Introduction - An Evolutionary Process 
To fully understand U.S. trade policy today, one must 
also understand its process of evolution. ~n particular, one must 
comprehend our trade policy of the late 1960's and early 1970 1 s, 
culminating in passage of the Trade Act of 1974. Putting it 
another way, a Brazilian businessman will be able to predict with 
much more accuracy what the U.S. will or will not do on trade 
issues in the coming years if he knows what the U.S. did or did 
not do on trade issues during the past few years, and why. Our 
trade policy of today is very much conditioned by the legislative 
intent of the Trade Act of 1974 which, in turn, is a function of 
what was done in earlier years and, more importantly, what was 
not done in earlier years. 
In the eyes of the U.S. public, and especially in the 
eyes of U.S. businessmen, many sins of omission have been com-
mitted by U.S. trade officials during the last couple of decades. 
Insofar as unfair trade practices of other nations are concerned, 
to say that we had a passive trade policy would be an understate-
rnent. Some would say we had a trade policy bordering on capitu-
lation! Our economy was s in those years, of course, and 
* Address before the Second.Plenary Session of the Brazil-U.S. 
~usiness Council, Washington, D. C., October 18, 1977. Dr. Yeutter, 
an economist and lawyer, was Deputy U.S. Special Trade Representat 
from 1975 to 1977. During that period he co-chaired the U.S.-Brazil 
Joint Working Group on International Trade. Prior to 1975, Dr. 
Yeutter s as Assistant Secretary of iculture for Internat 1 
Affairs. Presently he is a senior partner in the law firm of Ne son, 
rding, Yeutter, Leonard & Tate, with offices in shington, D. C. 
d several other cities. 
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most of the rest of the world had a level of living far below that 
of the u.s. Hence, there was a strong tendency hr our government 
officials to "turn the other cheekn when we were subjected to the 
unfair trade practices of others. It was felt that by doing so we 
would often accelerate the economic development of those nations, 
'and perhaps even make them stronger markets for U.S. products in 
the long run. 
By the late 1960 1 s, however, our agricultural economy 
was steeped in surpluses, farm prices had fallen, agricultural 
subsidies had increased, and both farmers and taxpayers were in a 
rebellious mood. Many U.S. agricultural leaders felt that at 
least part of their economic problems were due to the trade poli-
cies of other nations. Our dairy industry, for example, was 
adamant over the importation of subsidized dairy products from 
the European ~conornic t.Qmmunity. They sought enforcement of the 
U.S. countervailing duty law by the Treasury Department, but 
Treasury simply marked time for several years. Finally, the dairy 
industry filed suit, asking the Federal court to mandamus (force) 
implementation of the countervailing duty law. That suit had a 
lot to do with determining the provisions and the legislative 
intent of the subsidy-countervailing duty portions of the 1974 
Trade Act. 
Other agricultural groups were infuriated by the use of 
export subsidies to undercut U.S. sellers in third country markets. 
Though we used export subsidies for a time ourselves, their appli-
cation was much more limited than that of many of our competitors 
in both the developed and developing world. The provisions of 
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the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the GATT) were, and 
still are, ineffectual in dealing.with the third country subsidy 
problem. This situation led to passage of Section 301 of the 
Trade Act of 1974. ~~ 
Other domestic industries were concerned with the in-
; creased foreign competition they were facing in the U.S. market, 
some subsidized and some unsubsidized. Though the United States 
had long supported a more free and open international trading 
system, there were limits to how rapidly this country could 
adjust to foreign competition in labor intensive industries. A 
nation should not complain about legitimate competition from 
abroad, but neither can it tolerate the traumatic decline or 
demise of a whole series of its industries. Once again, the 
provisions of the GATT seemed not to be responsive to this 
difficult problem, and the inadequacies led to passage of 
Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974. 
Finally, there was considerable dissatisfaction with 
government-industry relationships in the Kennedy Round of multi-
lateral trade negotiations in the mid-1960 1 s. Though the U.S. 
probably did not fare as badly in the Kennedy Round as many of 
its critics thought, dissatisfaction with how those negotiations 
were handled persisted for years thereafter. Business, agricul-
tural, and labor representatives all felt that they were insuf-
ficiently consulted during the Kennedy Round. This led to the 
inclusion of a three tier advisory committee process in the 
Trade Act of 1974. The result is that our Tokyo Round negoti-
ators are now dealing with 45 separate private sector advisory 
committees, with approximately 900 members . (This is extremely 
. 
time consuming and sometimes frustrating; but if the advisors are 
listened to, this process virtually assures strong public support 
for positions taken by our negotiators at the MTN.~~ Putting it 
another way, our negotiators will depart from this advice at 
.1 their peril.) The Trade Act also specified detailed interagency 
coordination procedures for the determination of U.S. policy in 
the Tokyo Round. 
What I have just described is only part of the picture! 
Some new concerns evolved in the early 70's, on the eve of debate 
over the Trade Act. One was increased worry about competition from the 
lesser developed countries, with that emerging giant to the south, 
Brazil, being right in the middle of that picture. U.S. businesses 
had always fretted about competition from countries with much lower 
labor costs. But, with the exception of a few industries, this had 
been more rhetoric than reality until a few years ago. Then, however, 
$YStems of preferences began to evolve, with developing nations being 
given the privilege of exporting products on a duty-free basis to 
certain developed countries. Though this was not done in the United 
States until 1976, the handwriting was on the wall. People began to 
talk about a North-South dialogue, "improved relations with the third 
world", and a "New Economic Order". This struck fear into the heart, 
of many U.S. businesses, who could see the day dawning in which this 
country would be swamped with third world imports. That concern~ 
h1.l a ..,_,.,l,t"' 
undoubtedl1"i.mpact on ~he d~~fting of Section 201 of the Trade Act. 
U.S. businessmen were also concerned about 'increased protect-
ionism in many other countries of the world, at the same time that 
those countries sought to increase their exports to the United States. 
-4-
as m mmt a 
/ 
This applied to developed countries such as Japan, which maintained 
GATT illegal import quotas on numerous products while at the same 
time supporting their own firms in aggressive sales activities 
throughout the globe. It applied even more vividly Jn many third 
world countries, which implemented import restrictions for alleged 
balance of payments purposes or followed an oft-times short sighted 
import substitution policy while subsidizing their own exports to 
the developed world. It was difficult for a U.S. businessman to 
understand why he should grin and bear that kind of import competition 
from a Brazilian firm, for example, if he were precluded from selling his 
own product in the Brazilian market. (That very argument has surfaced 
on many occasions in the U.S. during the past couple of years with 
respect to present Brazilian import restrictions.) 
During this same period, our State Department haJ been in 
the passive trad~. State, for example, seemed to be 
genuinely pleased with the procrastination of Treasury officials in 
applying the U.S. countervailing duty law. That irritated a lot of 
U.S. businessmen, and it also irritated U.S. Congressmen when these 
attitudes surfaced during debate on the Trade Act. 
Finally, Congress had been dominated by the executive branch 
during the 1960 1 s and into the early 70's. The United States had had 
a series of strong Presidents, and Congressional leadership had been 
significantly divided, for a number of reasons. But, beginning at 
about the time of the Trade Act debates, the Congress finally began to 
reassert itself. The division of powers between the executive, the 
legislative, and the judiciary is the cornerstone of U.S. democracy. 
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Congress, and probably the Ainerican public as well, had concluded 
by l973 and 1974 that the pendulum had swung too far in the direction 
of the pecutive. This feeling was magnified, of course, by the 
events of Watergate. The upshot was that Congress '±egislated two 
major changes in ;,;:;e United States trade policy. 
The first change mandated responsiveness on the part of the 
executive branch to the trade policy needs Qf this country. It did 
this by providing timetables for essentially all of the major elements 
of the Act. 
The second was that it established Congressional overrides 
for many of the executive actions that could be taken under the Act. 
In other words, the President could no longer act with impunity on 
trade policy issues for, if he did so, he ran the risk of an embarrass-
ing override of his decision. 
Lest ycu be misled by this introduction, I must emphasize 
in the strongest possible terms that I do not consider the Trade Act 
of 1974 to be protectionist. It has been categorized as such by a 
number of representatives of other governments around the world, but 
I do not in any way share that assessment. I was intimately involved 
in the implementation of the Trade Act of 1974 during the first two 
years of its life - 1975 and 1976. In no way can the actions of the 
U.S. government during those two years be construed as protectionist. 
On the contrary, the United States bent over backwards to avoid taking 
safeguard actions unless an extremely persuasive case had been built 
by the affected domestic industry. Though I cannot speak for the Carter 
Administration, I have seen nothing over the past nine months to convince 
me that our basic trade policy has changed. 
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The new Administration has faced some very difficult policy questions 
during that period, and has handled-them in essentially the same way that 
they would have been handled under the prior hdministration. I am fully 
convinced that the U.S. will maintain its stunce in~{avor of free and 
open trade for as long into the future as one can reasonably predict. 
With that background in mind, let us now look at the specific 
provisions of the Trade Act of 1974 that wo~ld be of most interest to 
a Brazilian businessman. 
Section 201 - Safeguard Actions 
First, he would be concerned with the safeguard provisions 
of Section 201 of the Act. These provisions, of course, provide for 
the application of restrictions if imports are entering the U.S. in 
"such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious 
injury, or the threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing an 
article like or directly competitive with the imported article". This 
provision, taken alone, is not very helpful to a Brazilian businessman. 
Without more, he cannot determine when his exports to the U.S. might 
be endangered by a safeguard action. 
That "something more" is certainly not provided by Article 
XIX of the GATT, a deficiency that hopefully will be corrected in the 
Tokyo Round of~ multilateral trade negotiations. The U.S. Congress, 
however, helped this situation immeasurably by delineating specific 
criteria to be considered by the U.S. International Trade Commission 
when responding to petitions for relief filed by a domestic entity. The 
Congress said that in determining/"serious injury", the criteria to be 
considered should be: a significant idling of productive facilities, the 
inability of a significant number of firms to operate at a reasonable level 
of Pfofit, and significant unemployment or underemployment within the 
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industry. The criteria for "threat of serious injury" are: a decline in 
larger arid c __ ,rowing inventory, and a downward trend in production, sales, a 
f ·t wages or employment in the affected domestic industry. pro is, 
Both foreign and domestic firms can look*at data applicable 
to the U.S. industry with which they compete, and evaluate {l) the 
1 likelihood of a domestic firm or industry filing a petition for safe-
guard relief, and (2) the likelihood of the,_USITC recommending relief. 
As a practical matter, what all this means is that foreign 
firms ought to be circumspect in their endeavors to gain an increasing 
share of the U.S. market of a particular product. If the increase in 
import penetration is gradual, U.S. firms may well be able to adjust to 
that competition, either by becoming more competitive or by diversifying 
into other industries. 
a petition for relief. 
If they can adjust, they are not likely to file 
If, on the other hand, they are bombarded by 
import competition, and are forced to lay off large numbers of employees, 
reduce dividends, suffer a loss in the value of their shares, etc., they 
will quite likely file a Section 201 petition out of desperation. 
(Wouldn't you under similar i;'ircumstances?) If a petition is filed, and 
if relief is recommended by the USITC and granted by the Administration, 
the foreign exporter will suffer a setback in his U.S. sales for several 
years to come. That setback might have been avoided if the exporter had 
exercised a bit more caution in his U.S. market moves. 
A classic example of the point I have just made is the recent 
case of color television receivers from Japan. About fifteen months ago, 
I was in Japan, and I warned the Japanese that they were increasing their 
share of the U.S. color television market at an inordinate rate. 
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I told them that if they were to persist in their marketing practices, 
which seemed destined to capture a very large percentage of U.S. sales, 
that they were liable to provoke a safeguard request by the U.S. 
domestic industry. The Japanese persisted, their rate of import 
._4 
penetration continued to increase, the U.S. industry was provoked, and 
/they did file a request for import relief. After much negotiating, the 
Japanese industry is now dramatically reducing its export sales to the 
United States. In the short run1 at leas1jits share of the U.S. market 
will now be consid~rably smaller than would otherwise have been the case. 
For Japan, haste made waste in this instance, and their aggressive sales 
programs turned out to be counterproductive. Hopefully, exporters from 
Brazil and other countries will learn from this case study, and handle 
their own marketing efforts in a more discerning way. 
As I indicated earlier, petitions for safeguard relief under 
Section 201 of the Trade Act go initially to the U.S. International 
Trade Commission, which makes its determination of injury or threat of 
injury, and then forwards its recommendations to the President. Those 
recommendations actually go to the Office of th~ Special Trade Representa-
tive (on behalf of the President), where they are evaluated and analyzed 
in an interagency process chaired by appropriate STR officials. The 
Special Trade Representative ultimately sends the interagency recommenda-
tion to the President, who makes and announces the final decision. That 
decision is then subject to a Congressional override within the pre-
scribed time period. I will have more to say on the interagency process 
later in this presentation. 
Section 301 - Retaliation fot Unfair Trade Practices 
Section 301 of the Trade Act may well be the most powerful 
weapon in the U.S. trade policy arsenal. 
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to provide Jhe President of <;:;;-,J' "H ; c'-l I clear(f intent ()f J,,,._J ~t.i(iV'"t./y 
d St t 1. th thP 1r,eans to act quickly~gai· nst the unfair the Unite a es w - , 
trade practices of othef nations ~hro1.gh these p~ovisio~s, irrespective 
-rt< , \I'(' ta. I ; ~ to v-t a c. t , c '- 1 J ;;t lt t 
of whether or not tlwy ~re in accord with rules of ,GATT! 
To date, however, the executive branch has been restrained 
/ 
in its use of this tremendously powerful tool. 
/ 
In all cases where 
Section 301 complaints have involved a particular GATT provision, 
the executive has held the Section 3-01 action in abeyance while seek-
ing a solution to the problem under the GATT rules. Only if present 
GATT rules seem not to fit a particular Section 301 situation, or if 
· j-,..1 i...c,. l 
the GATT is unresponsive, will the executive proceed under Section 301. 
This would seem to be a responsible policy position, and Section 301 
has certainly not led to the international consternation that some of 
our trading partners anticipated when it was first enacted. 
It should be understood, however, that the United States is 
not likely to be as tolerant of unfair trade practices in the future as 
it has been in the past. Congress sent this message to the executive 
branch when it incorporated Section 301 in the Trade Act, and Congress 
will insist on responsiveness in cases such as those of third country 
subsidies which undercut U.S. business enterprises. 
At the moment, Section 301 does not contain a legislatively 
mandated timetable. The Congress will undoubtedly add that timetable 
though if any U.S. administration does not implement the Section 301 
provisions in a timely way. 
Section 301 differs from the safeguard provisions of the law 
in that petitions are filed directly with the Office of the Special Trade 
Representative, rather than with the U.S. International Trade Commission. 
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The STR then handles the administrative processes that are involved, 
culminating in a recommendation to the President. The Congressional 
override provisions are somewhat d~erent from those of Section 201, 
and have not been tested to date. /,f;; taking action under Section 301, 
•. t. 
the President can retaliate against the offending unfair trade competi-
tor in a wide variety of ways. This is what makes this pr~vision such 
a powerful tool if it is fully used. 
•. 
Subsidies and Countervailing Duties 
The subsidy-countervailing duty provisions of the Act are 
somewhat different from those of either Section 201 or Section 301. 
These complaints, for example, are filed with the Treasury Department, 
which has for many years had responsibility for the application of 
countervailing duties. It was the inaction of Treasury, the non-applica-
tion of countervailing duties if you will, that stimulated the inclusion 
of a mandatory countervailing timetable in the Trade Act of 1974. That 
timetable now calls for a preliminary determination by Treasury as to 
whether a bounty or grant (i.e., a subsidy) is being paid or bestowed, 
the determination to be made within six months after a petition has been 
filed. Treasury must make its final determination within twelve months 
after filing of the petition. There is no injury provision involved, 
except for duty-free imports. On the latter, the U.S. International 
Trade Commission must make an injury determination, within three months 
after final determination by Treasury. 
As you undoubtedly know, the present GATT provisions·on 
subsidies and countervailing duties are grossly inadequate. They are 
both nebulous and inconsistent and, as a consequence, rarely used. 
Changes have been under discussion in the GATT for years, but nothing of 
substance has emerged. 
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In order to encourage the negotiation of an effective multi-
lateral code on subsidies and countervailing duties, the Congress 
included certain discretionary provisions in those sections of the 
Trade Act of 1974. In essence, this provides Treasury with the option 
of not countervailing against the subsidies of Brazil or any other 
J nation if certain criteria are met. The criteria call for progress 
being made in the multilateral trade negotiations in Geneva, coupled 
with a substantial diminution in the subsidy itself. This authority 
has been used on a number of occasions since passage of the Trade Act, 
but it is scheduled to expire in January, 1979. That should raise a 
danger signal to Brazilian and other exporters, for if an acceptable 
subsidy-countervailing duty code is not negotiated in Geneva and approved 
by the U.S. Congress prior to that date, Treasury must return to manda-
tory countervailing. This neans that it is imperative that such a code 
be agreed upon in Geneva by the sur.lrr1er of 19 78, or by the fall of next 
year at the very latest. 
The government of Brazil has been in the forefront of the 
negotiations in Geneva, so your representatives understand the subsidy-
countervailing duty issue very well. In fact, the Brazilian delegation 
in Geneva and your trade policy officials in Brasilia have exercised 
outstanding leadership on this question. They have a comprehensive 
and perceptive understanding of the key issues that are involv'ed. 
The United States has said that it is prepared to consider 
different rules for the subsidy practices of developing nations such as 
·1 Q... f h b · 0 • Brazi th~n or t e su siay practices of developing nations (or the 
U.S., if we should ever use them), such as the European Economic Community 
or Japan. 
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But agreement has not yet been reached on what those special rules 
may be. There is no time to dwell on the intricacies of that issue 
today, but I do want to emphasize the pervasive interest of U.S. 
c:.~ ~ ~ < 
agricultural and industrial oe~an:t:-es in this entire question. 
An alteration in the present U.S. injury provision (under which domestic 
/ industries need not prove ir.jury) will not come easy. If a code 
with such an alteration is brought back fro~ the Geneva negotiations, 
it will be approved by the U.S. Congress only if that alteration is 
reasonable, and if it is balanced h· other elements of positive interest 
to the United States. All of the industry, labor, and agricultural 
advisory committees (i.e., all 45) are united on this point! 
My advice to exporters, Brazilian or others, is that they 
not rely on subsidies to penetrate the United States market, or other 
markets around the world. Though subsidies may have short run benefits, 
in the long run they serve as a disincentive to the development of 
production efficiencies. Brazil has the basic natural and human 
resources to be competitive in its export oriented snc~ors. Therefore, 
subsidies should be necessary for only a short period of time, if at 
all. If your industries can achieve competitiveness without the help 
of subsidies, you need not worry about the uncertainty of countervailing 
duties. If I were a Brazilian businessman, I would try to avoid that 
uncertainty. 
Generalized System of Preferences 
The U. S. implemented its Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP) on January 1, 1976. At that time, Brazil was among those 
designated as ''beneficiary countries" and is, therefore, entitled to 
the benefits of the program. 
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At time of implementation, approximately 2,700 products 
were placed on the GSP approved list, with those products having a 
trade value of about $25 billion (nearly one-fourth of U.S. total 
imports). Approximately $2.5 billion worth of the~e imports was then 
being provided by the lesser developed nations. This meant that the 
'LDC's, including Brazil, were given an opportunity to capture some or 
all of the remaining $22.5 billion that was,then being exported to 
the United States by countries not entitled to GSP benefits (along 
with any additional market growth which might occur). Obviously, 
being able to sell in the U.S. market on a duty-free basis should give 
the lesser developed nations a considerable advantage over their 
competitors. That advantage will, of course, vary from product to 
product and country to country, depending upon the tariff level 
applicable to imports from non-beneficiary countries, transportation 
costs, and other variables. 
Though some products have been added to the list since 
January 1, 1976, and others removed, there are still about 2,700 
items eligible for GSP. Many of them are produced in the diverse 
economy of Brazil. With your relatively close geographic proximity 
to the United States, Brazilian businessmen should be able to benefit 
greatly from the GSP program, even though it presently has only a 
ten-year timeframe. 
A number of studies have shown that many foreign exporters 
are still failing to take full advantage of potential GSP benefits. 
If this situation prevails in Brazil, our Emtassy and trade officials 
should work together in helping Brazilian businessmen to understand 
and follow our GSP procedures. This will pay major dividends for you, 
contributing not only to the profit and loss statements of your individual 
companies, but also to your dPlicate balance of pay~12nt situation. 
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that are not 
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itl 
treatment, and avoiding the removal of el ibil 
(and reinstatement of duties) on products of interest 
to you. U.S. , on the other hand, will argue 
vigorously for restraint in adding new products to 
the list, and for re tatement of s where 
import penetration rates are rising dramatically. 
You will wish to make sure that your views are 
effectively articulated in this semi-annual procedure, 
for you may have a great deal at stake in its out-
come. 
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Public Hearings 
Unlike many other countries, the United States has a 
very open decision-making process for its governmental actions. 
This is true not only in trade policy but in mos-t of its other 
governmental activities as well. We are proud of this approach 
to decision making, and cherish it as one of our most basic and 
important democratic institutions. 
What this means is that Brazilian businessmen, the 
Brazilian government, and almost anyone else in the world can 
make an input to our trade policy decisions. This is tradi-
tionally done through a public hearing, which is announced in 
the Federal Register with ample advance notice for preparation 
of testimony. In some instances, there are even a series of 
public hearings, held. over a period of weeks in a nurr~er of 
different geographic locations. Depending upon the issue 
involved, most such hearings are held either before the U.S. 
International Trade Cornmission or the Office of the Special 
Trade Representative. 
Section 201 of the Trade Act, the safeguard provi-
sion, mandates public hearings. Section 301, the unfair 
trade provision, does not make hearings compulsory, but it 
does provide that "any interested persons" (which would 
certainly include a Brazilian businessman if the Section 301 
action were directed at a Brazilian trade practice) may 
request a public hearing "before the President takes any 
action." As I indicated earlier in this paper, hearings are 
also provided as an integral part of the GSP program. 
If Brazil is likely to be adversely affected by U.S. 
trade policy action, I would strongly advocate your participa-
tion in our public hearing process. Though your presentation 
might logically be made by someone on behalf of-'-all Brazilian 
entities who will be similarly affected, there is no harm in 
1 having additional presentations by individual businessmen. 
Obviously, it would not be desirable for--200 Brazilians to 
present essentially the same testimony, but if a particular 
firm will be traumatically affected by the proposed U.S. 
action, and if the impact is unusual or unique with respect 
to that firm, there may be reason for that businessman to 
present separate testimony. One should also remember that 
written views can be submitted to the appropriate U.S. agency, 
even if testimony is not presented at the public hearing. In 
other words, as a Brazilian businessman you have at least 
three options in presenting your side of the story re a pend-
ing U.S. trade action: (1) presentation of written views 
to the U.S. agency which will be conducting the public hearing; 
(2) presentation of an oral statement at the public hearing; 
and (3) presentation of written and/or oral views during the 
interagency deliberations which take place subsequent to the 
public hearing. I will discuss the latter process more fully 
in a few moments. 
You have similar opportunities to present your view-
point in subsidy-countervailing duty cases. This is particu-
larly so during the period when Treasury is investigating the 
-17-
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complaint. Foreign governments and foreign businessmen sometimes 
display resentment when Treasury officials visit their country 
and their businesses in order to obtain information and data 
relative to the complaint. Occasionally, they refuse to co-
operate in any way. This is an extremely short-sighted and 
unwise policy, since Treasury must make a decision based on 
the information that it has. Therefore, in the absence of 
cooperation from the foreign business interests whose actions 
are being challenged, Treasury will almost inevitably find a 
"bounty or grant". In addition, if foreign officials and 
foreign businessmen fail to cooperate in this investigatory 
process, it is not likely that Treasury officials will be 
sympathetic to the exercise of their discretionary authority 
under the Trade Act (to choose not to countervail against the 
bounty or grant). In other words, failure to cooperate in 
these cases will almost inevitably lead to the application of 
countervailing duties by the United States government. 
Returning to the public hearing process itself, a 
few recoITmendations on the mode of presentation might be in 
order. First of all, a written document should always be 
presented at the hearing so that it may be distributed to 
people who have an interest in the case. The press will be 
in attendance at most public hearings, so this provides you 
with an opportunity for local, and sometimes even national, 
coverage of your views on the issue. Aside from its avail-
ability at the hearing, your presentation can also be released 
·-18-
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to the press by your own embassy officials here in Washington, 
D. c. In addition, use of a written paper at the hearing permits 
its distribution to key U.S. government officials who might not 
be in attendance at the hearing, or who might rtd"t have the time 
or opportunity to read a transcript of all the oral presenta-
tions. 
It should be obvious that your written presentation 
at a hearing is very important. This means that it should be well 
done, carefully prepared -- short, to-the-point, and written in 
understandable, non-technical language. It should be factual, 
rather than emotional; long on substance, and short on rhetoric. 
Since the basic written statement should be succinct, 
you may wish to include additional appendices that will provide 
the necessary backup argument and data in support of your 
position. These documents can be extremely helpful to the 
"working level" people who will be analyzing and evaluating the 
testimony during the interagency discussion process. So the 
appendices should also be well prepared, and close attention 
should be given to their accuracy and objectivity. If there 
are errors, either deliberate or inadvertent, the documents 
will lose their credibility and will be heavily discounted in 
the evaluation process. 
Attention should also be given to your oral testimony, 
and you should carefully select the individual who will present 
that testimony. It should be someone who is knowledgeable on 
the issue at hand, articulate, and experienced at handling 
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difficult questions in a highly charged atmosphere . 
. --~ If you have a Brazilian businessman who fits those 
criteria, I would strongly recommend that he present 
the testimony. If not, you should employ a spokesman 
to do so on your behalf. But do not '-shy away from this 
opportunity. It may be your best chance to defuse 
your opposition. You will receive challenging and 
pointed questions at a public hearing, for that is its 
purpose. U.S. officials presiding at the hearing want 
to "get to the bottom of the issue 11 • If your spokes-
man can handle those tough questions well, his testimony 
can have a major impact on the attitude of those offi-
cials, and the recommendations they ultimately make to 
their superiors. 
In summary, the public hearing is an extremely 
important element in the making of U.S. trade policy and 
one which can work to either the advantage or the dis-
advantage of an affected Brazilian businessman, depend-
ing on how effectively he presents his case at that 
stage of the proceedings. It is an opportunity that 
merits your careful attention. 
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The Interagency Process 
Essentially all trade policy decisions by the execu-
tive branch are made as a result of an interagency process, 
which can sometimes seem interminable! This appiues irrespec-
tive of how the process was initiated -- by petition to the U.S. 
J International Trade Commission, as is the case with Section 201 
safeguard actions; by petition to the Office of the Special 
Trade Representative, as is the case with Section 301 unfair 
practice complaints; or by complaint to the Department of 
Treasury, as is the case with export subsidy-countervailing 
duty actions. In the subsidy cases, and in those involving 
anti-dumping complaints, the interagency process is coordi-
nated by appropriate Treasury Department officials. In 
essentially all other cases (one example being the GSP review 
that was just described) the trade policy decision making process 
is coordinated by the Office of the Special Trade Representative. 
When this process first begins, it is usually handled 
by the Trade Policy Staff Committee (1fAc). The participants 
are at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level, or just below. 
The Chairman of the TPSC is an Assistant Special Trade Representa-
tive. All major departments of the U.S./overnment are repre-
sented, including State, Treasury, Commerce, Labor, Agriculture, 
and often other entities such as the Council of Economic 
Advisors and the National Security Council. 
It is at the TPSC level that a particular issue is 
thoroughly researched and comprehensively debated, with positions 
being forcefully argued from the specific point of view of the 
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individual Departments that are represented. Sometimes even 
subcommittees or working groups"of the TPSC are used in order 
to zero in on specific questions. The hope is that ultimately 
a consensus will emerge from the TPSC debates (which may so~etimes 
take place over a period of several weeks), and a U.S. position 
.1 will be delineated. 
On a good many occasions, the position of a particular 
Department on a given trade issue is so vigorously and uncom-
promisingly defended that a TPSC consensus becomes impossible. 
This means that the debate will then be escalated to the Trade 
Policy Review Group {TPRG) where it is fully debated once again. /" ~ chaired by the Deputy Special Trade Representativ7 
i;,,be po. it ion I occupied rur the pas L b,10 year:,. 
Essentially the same agencies are represented 9n the 
TPRG as ~n the TPSC. The only difference is that the discussion 
is now held at the Assistant Secretary or, at a minimum, the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary level. Since members of the TPRG 
are almost always Presidential appointees, the political input 
becomes greater at this stage of the deliberations. All aspects 
of the issue -- domestic and foreign, political and economic 
are fully considered by the TPRG, and ordinarily a consensus 
will emerge. Nearly all of the very difficult and sensitive 
trade policy positions by the United States are crystallized 
within the Trade Policy Review Group. Occasionally, however, 
consensus is impossible even here. In those rare instances, 
the issue must be taken to the highest interagency level, the 
Trade Policy Committee (TPC}. This Committee is chaired by 
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the Special Trade Representative and the participants are Cabinet 
members or, at a minimum, Assistant Secretaries. 
Sometimes even the Cabinet level TPC is unable to 
resolve strongly held interagency differences. A*d occasionally 
it becomes apparent at the TPRG level that those differences 
are so profound that taking the issue to the TPC would be a 
fruitless endeavor. In both these cases, --the issue must go to the 
President for final resolution. This is generally done through 
preparation of a Presidential decision-making memorandum, which 
will encompass the various options, the pros and cons of each, 
and the positions taken by each of the agencies. 
If consensus is achieved by the lowest level inter-
agency group, the 'I'PSC, the recommendation of that group will 
ordinarily be forwarded to the President by the Special Trade 
Representative, and, if he concurs, the decision is eventually 
announced either by The White House Press Office, or the Office 
of the Special Trade Representative (or both of them simultaneously) 
on behalf of the President. Usually the announcement is made by 
the STR, unless a matter of great international significance is 
involved. The same course is followed when consensus is achieved 
at either the TPRG or TPC level. 
I have delineated this process in detail, because it 
provides the basis for which a Brazilian businessman, or the 
Brazilian government, can determine where to make an input. I 
respectfully offer the following suggestions. 
First1 it is obvious that your views should be enunci-
ated, in some manner, before all of the key agencies. The modus 
operandi may well differ from agency to agency, depending on 
the issue, the probable position of the agency, the personal 
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contacts that you have in that agency, etc. This is the art of 
lobbying, and you will wish to formulate your own judgment as 
to how each of the agencies are approached, at what level, 
and by whom. It should be apparent though thal the sending 
of a diplomatic communication to the State Department is not 
likely to be determinative. State is very influential in this 
process, of course, but it is only one a-gency among several. 
And its effectiveness is often reduced when it takes the 
position of a foreign country without attempting to balance 
those interests with U.S. domestic interests. 
Second, it is important that the "working level" 
TPSC have all the background information that is essential to 
a comprehensive and objective analysis of the issue. In other 
words, it is clearly in the best interest of a foreign govern-
ment or foreign industry to lay its cards on the table. Holding 
back any of the basic facts is likely to be a most unwise policy. 
Unless the career civil servants who prepare the basic back-
ground papers for TPSC deliberation and briefing papers for 
their high-level officials in the TPRG and TPC, have all the 
facts, your position is not likely to be effectively enunciated 
within the U.S. government. 
Third, you will wish to follow the interagency 
process closely so that you will know whether a U.S. position 
has been developed at the TPSC level, or whether the issue 
is being escalated to the TPRG or TPC level. If it is 
escalated, then you have another challenge -- that of bringing 
your viewpoint to the attention of the Presidential appointees 
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who will be involved at that stage of the proceedings. Again, 
your input should be provided in all the agencies, or at least 
the two or three with the strongest interest in the issue at 
hand. In particular, you will need to effectively articulate 
. . . .«... your viewpoint to agencies that are likely to BQ il,,11 oppos~~ioa 
1 -ee- you on the issue. The timing of your input is, of course, 
just as important as the content or the method of delivering 
it. Do not make the mistake of counseling with Assistant 
Secretaries when the issue is being deliberated at the TPSC 
level. By the same token, do not make the mistake of counseling 
with low-level officials once the issue has been escalated to 
the TPRG. That again is just a matter of effective governmental 
relations. 
Fourth, note that most decisions are ultimately made 
at the TPRG level, under the chairmanship of the Deputy Special 
Trade Representative. This means that it is very important 
that the Deputy STR fully understand your viewsx and the 
international ramifications of the decision. 
Finally, do not forget the Congress. 
,ar~Eviously\not directly involved in policy making by the 
executive branch, 
the total process. 
they certainly play an influential role in 
Thl·s 1·s <O t 1 b th h ~ no on y ecause ey ave 
override authority under the Trade Act, but also because both 
the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means 
Committee take a great deal of interest in this subject. The 
Office of the Special Trade Representative briefs them fre-
quently on trade policy issues, they are well briefed by their 
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own staffs as well, they receive a great deal of input from 
the 45 MTN advisory committees, and they hear a great deal 
from their constituents, as well. With the constant communi-
cation that takes place between these two key committees and 
various trade policy officials of the Administration, their 
1 input can have a strong indirect influence on an eventual 
Administration decision. 
U.S. Trade Policy in the Future 
Having comprehensively described the U.S. trade 
policy apparatus, perhaps it would be appropriate to spend 
a few minutes on how that apparatus will likely be used in the 
future. 
First, I do not expect a major change in basic U.S. 
trade policy attitudes. A few years ago, we had an overvalued 
dollar, which made it difficult for us to compete in the world. 
That, however, is no longer the case. In an era of floating 
exchange rates, the U.S. economy should be able to hold its 
own in international commerce. Hence, a reduction of trade 
barriers will be in our overall interest, and it should also 
be in the overall interest of the world as a whole. Your 
country will emerge as a major economic power over the next 
several decades, so Brazil too will find the reduction of trade 
barriers to be in its long-term best interest even though the 
energy crisis is causing great difficulty at the moment. 
The energy crisis is hurting us too. We are now 
running the largest balance of payments deficit in our history, 
and this will inexorably lead to a decline in the value of our 
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currency. Though that may make us more competitive inter-
nationally, it will also create additional inflationary 
pressures here at home. From a trade policy standpoint, it 
,._~ 
magnifies the risks and pressures of protectionismatJe are 
facing many of those pressures right now. 
U.S. trade policy attitudes obviously vary from one 
sector of the economy to another. I am sure the same holds 
true in Brazil. By and large, our industrial sector feels 
much more comfortable with the international economic situa-
tion than it did a few years ago. We have dramatically 
increased our exports of manufactured products in recent 
years, and our balance of trade in that sector would be 
excellent were it not for the existence of the energy cartel. 
Our capital intensive industries, and particularly those which 
use advanced technology, are, of course, doing much better than 
our labor intensive industries. It is in the latter where many 
of our protectionist pressures -- and the ensuing safeguard 
actions -- arise. 
In the not-too-distant past, our labor unions were 
supporters of a free and open trading system. 
however, that attitude has gradually changed. 
In recent years, 
The success of 
these unions has led to a reversal of their trade policy 
views. U.S. wage rates have risen much 1nore rapidly than 
those of most countries, particularly the lesser developed 
nations. For a time, adVanccs in technology, modernization 
of factories, etc., increased our per-man productivity to a 
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point where we could still compete with low-cost labor elsewhere. 
Ultimately though, we reached beyond that point and our labor 
intensive industries fell behind those of Taiwan, Korea, Brazil, 
._.,. 
Spain, Mexico, and a number of other more advanced LDC economies. 
This has created great pressures on our labor union leadership 
in this country to resist the intrusion of imports, and to 
protect our domestic industries. With wage rates also in-
creasing in Western Europe, Japan, and many other developed 
countries, those same pressures prevail there as well. This 
has led to an expanded economic confrontation between the de-
veloped and the developing world, and the LDC demand for 
"special and differential treatment" in international trade 
policy. 
The U.S. agricultur~(sector has traditionally favored 
liberalized trade because of its great efficiency and competi-
tiveness. Our agricultural exports have quadrupled in the 
past decade, and give promise of increasing still more in the 
coming years. We have a positive trade balance in this sector 
of $10 billion or thereabouts each year, except when it freezes 
in Brazil and coffee prices skyrocket! Though you are one of 
our best customers of agricultural products, you also have a 
great deal of agricultural export potential and are thereby a 
competitor as well. But we welcome this competition. With a 
product such as soybeans, there should be ample sales opportuni-
ties throughout the world.for both of us. In fact, we have a 
common interest in developing that and other agricultural 
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export markets, and ought to work together in doing so. Through 
our mutual efforts, both multilaterally and bilaterally 1 we 
should be able to open up new and exciting marketing oppor-
tunities for our agricultural products. 
Even U.S. agriculture is not always free trade oriented . 
.1 We have restrictions on the importation of dairy products, but 
this is primarily due to the export subsidy practices of other 
dairy producing nations. We also have a voluntary restraint 
program on beef, which is not all that voluntary! And we even 
had a clamor from our soybean producers a couple of years ago 
when palm oil imports increased dramatically. Nevertheless, 
one must not be misled by individual situations which garner 
headlines at a given moment. When examining U.S. trade policy, 
one should always take the broad perspective and examine the 
attitude of a sector (such as agriculture) as a whole, and 
the nation as a whole. When this is done, U.S. agriculture 
clearly comes out on the side of freer trade, as does our 
industrial sector. Though labor may be on the other side, 
notwithstanding the political power of our unions~ the nation 
as a whole would clearly be in the open trading column. After 
all, labor union members, industralists, and farmers are all 
consumers, and if the principle of comparative advantage is 
valid - as I fully believe it to be -- the consumers of all 
nations should be advocates of a more free and open trading 
system. 
Note too that the United States has said "no" to 
protectionism in a number of very politically sensitive situa-
tions over the past two or three years. Even in footwear, a 
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product of much interest to Brazil, permanent trade restrictions 
were avoided though import penetration had reached an exceeding-
ly high level. It is noteworthy too that Brazil was not in-
eluded in the voluntary restraint agreement that~was reached. 
In summary, I would denominate the following U.S. trade 
policy characteristics as being most important to a Brazilian 
businessman: (1) the open nature of the'aecision making process, 
which gives you ample opportunity to present your views before 
an action is taken; (2) a positive attitude toward a more open 
international trading system (notwithstanding the pressures of 
protectionist views), and the willingness to exert leadership 
to that end; and (3) a lower level of tolerance for the unfair 
trade practices of all other nations, and particularly for 
those of our fellow developed countries. I construe these 
characteristics to be a solid base upon which to build a good 
and enduring trade relationship between the United States and 
Brazil. 
# # # 
